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scheme, to create a widespread exclusion for the food
and housing expenses of agricultural and ranch owners
who happen to organize their business under
Subchapter S.  Indeed if this were true, then one would
expect all ranchers and farmers to organize under
Subchapter S and exclude all their housing and lodging
expenses from their income.  This would hardly be a
fair result unless all business owners who must live in
the city to be near their business for a variety of reasons
were allowed to deduct their food and lodging expenses
as well.  Such a result is unthinkable and this Court will
not construe the IRC to reach this outcome."
Although only dictum, this passage demonstrates that the
Dilts court fundamentally misunderstands both the corporate
structure and the statutory provisions under I.R.C. § 119.
Certainly, a farm corporation can and does have employees
and, if it is a C corporation, the employees have long been
entitled to exclude the value of meals and lodging from
income.  The court in Dilts reached the correct conclusion
but, unfortunately, in careless dictum has improperly cast
doubt on the handling of meals and lodging by farm and
ranch corporations.  The slap at Wilhelm v. United States 24
was gratuitous and unnecessary.  That case was decided long
before either of the limitations was enacted for S
corporations on the handling of meals and lodging.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
HORSES-ALM § 1.01[2].* The plaintiff was injured
when the plaintiff’s automobile struck a mare owned by the
defendant. The defendant lived on the farm but worked in a
nearby city and often spent several days away from the
farm. The defendant hired a worker to feed the horses but
the worker quit without notice several days before the
accident. Although the horses were kept in a fenced corral
and barn, the horses escaped and one wandered onto the
highway and was struck by the plaintiff’s car. The plaintiff
claimed that the defendant was negligent in failing to
properly confine the horse and in failing to hire a
responsible and careful worker. The plaintiff also claimed
that the defendant was negligent because the defendant,
through the worker, had constructive knowledge of the
escape of the horses. The court held that the evidence
showed that the defendant had no knowledge of the escape
until after the accident and that the worker quit before the
escape; therefore, the defendant had no prior actual or
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constructive knowledge of the escape. The court also held
that the defendant used sufficient means of containing the
horses and that the plaintiff failed to show how the horses
escaped through any negligence of the defendant. The court
held that if the worker let the horses escape when the worker
quit, the defendant was not liable because the worker’s
actions were outside the scope of the employment and the
plaintiff failed to show that the defendant knew or should
have known that the worker would take such actions. Briggs
v. Finley, 631 N.E.2d 959 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtor was a buyer of
agricultural commodities for resale and had purchased
commodities for which payment had not been made. The
debtor had granted a security interest in the produce to a
creditor. The bankruptcy trustee sought to avoid the security
interest in the produce as violating the Perishable
Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA), 7 U.S.C. § 499e(c).
The court held that the statute did not void all such security
interests as to everyone but only as to commodity producers
who had perfected their rights in the PACA trust as to
produce for which no payment had been received. The court
held that the trustee could not use the PACA trust provisions
to avoid a security interest in the produce because the
trustee had no rights in the PACA trust. In re N. Merberg
& Sons, Inc., 166 B.R. 567 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1994).
A creditor had attached a judicial lien against the
debtor’s homestead in which the debtor had no equity. The
debtor sought to avoid the judicial lien as impairing the
homestead exemption but the creditor objected on the basis
that the judicial lien secured a nondischargeable debt
because of the debtor’s willful and malicious actions. The
court held that the dischargeability of the debt secured by
the judicial lien did not affect the avoidability of the debt
and that the judicial lien was avoidable even though the
debtor had no equity in the homestead. In re Ash, 166 B.R.
202 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994).
The debtors sought avoidance of judicial liens against
their homestead which they claimed as exempt under Ohio
Rev. Code § 2329.66(A)(1). The court held that under the
Ohio exemption, the exemption was allowed only as against
"execution, garnishment, attachment or sale" and thus did
not provide any exemption in a bankruptcy case.  Therefore,
no exemption was impaired by the judicial liens and the
liens could not be avoided. In re Moreland, 21 F.3d 102
(6th Cir. 1994), rev’g, 142 B.R. 221 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1992).
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS. Prior to the filing of the
bankruptcy petition, a secured creditor had foreclosed on the
debtor’s real property and the property was sold at an
auction which met the state law requirements for foreclosure
sales and was neither collusive nor fraudulent. However, the
sale produced proceeds of less than 50 percent of the
claimed fair market value of the property. The debtor sought
to avoid the foreclosure sale under Section 548(a)(2) as not
for “reasonably equivalent value.” The court held that a
foreclosure sale which met the state law requirements for a
foreclosure sale conclusively met the Section 548(a)(2)
requirement of “reasonably equivalent value.” BFP v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S.Ct. 1757 (1994).
EXEMPTIONS
HOMESTEAD. The debtor filed a Chapter 7 petition
and claimed a homestead exemption. The debtor died two
weeks after the petition was filed and no family member
continued to live in the house. The trustee objected to the
exemption because of the death of the debtor. The court held
that the exemption was determined as of the date of the
petition and allowed the exemption. In re Combs, 166 B.R.
417 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1994).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
TRUSTEE FEES-ALM § 13.03[8]. During the
administration of the debtor’s Chapter 12 plan, the Attorney
General set the trustee’s fee at 11.111111 percent of all plan
payments. The rate was based on the interpretation of 28
U.S.C. § 586(e)(1) to include payment of the trustee’s fees
as a plan payment also subject to the trustee fee. Thus, the
maximum rate of 10 percent was charged against the
debtor’s payments of the trustee’s fees. The Bankruptcy
Court held that the 11.111111 percent rate exceeded the
statutory maximum of 10 percent and ordered return of fees
assessed in excess of 10 percent. The appellate court
reversed, holding that because the statute was ambiguous,
the Attorney General’s interpretation was to be given
deference.  In re BDT Farms, Inc., 21 F.3d 1019 (10th
Cir. 1994), rev’g unrep. D. Ct. dec. aff’g, 152 B.R. 642
(Bankr. W.D. Okl. 1993), aff’g on recon., 150 B.R. 795
(Bankr. W.D. Okl. 1993).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ABANDONMENT. The debtor’s filing for Chapter 7
stayed a pending state court action for replevin by a creditor
with a security interest in the debtor’s farm machinery. The
bankruptcy trustee moved to abandon the machinery to the
debtor. The debtor objected because the debtor’s income tax
basis in the machinery was zero and a sale of the machinery
would result in over $18,000 in taxable gain to the debtor.
The debtor asked that the machinery be abandoned directly
to the creditor in the hope that the creditor or bankruptcy
estate would be charged with the taxable gain. The court
held that the abandonment of the machinery to the debtor
would not result in any recognition of gain under I.R.C. §
1398(f)(2) and that the abandonment had to be to the debtor
because the debtor held the highest possessory interest in the
property on the date of the bankruptcy filing. Matter of
Popp, 166 B.R. 697 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1993).
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtor had failed to file
income tax returns for ten years. The IRS filed substitute
returns and made assessments based on those returns. The
IRS attempted to levy on the debtor’s residence but the sale
of the house was prevented by the debtor filing a Chapter 11
case. The IRS again attempted the sale when the debtor
dismissed that case but the debtor filed the instant case the
day before the scheduled sale. After the case was one year
old, the IRS moved for relief from the automatic stay to sell
the house, arguing that the debtor had abused the
bankruptcy process in order to prevent the sale. The debtor
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argued that relief from the stay was prohibited because the
IRS was adequately protected since the house was worth
more than the levy amount. The debtor failed to provide any
proof of the value of the house. The court held that relief
from the automatic stay could be granted “for cause,”
including abuse of the bankruptcy process and that the
debtor’s failure to file income tax returns and the multiple
filings just before the sales indicated that the filings were
intended only to thwart the IRS. I.R.S. v. Bacha, 166 B.R.
611 (Bankr. D. Md. 1993).
CLAIMS. The IRS filed an untimely claim which was
partially secured and partially unsecured. The Bankruptcy
Court had allowed only the secured portion of the claim and
disallowed the unsecured portion as untimely filed. The
appellate court affirmed. U.S. v. Clark, 166 B.R. 446 (D.
Utah 1993).
PRIORITY TAX CLAIMS. The debtor received a pre-
petition reversion of amounts in a retired employee pension
plan and the IRS assessed the excise tax under I.R.C. §
4980(a). The IRS filed a claim for the taxes as a priority tax
claim and the other creditors objected, arguing that the tax
was actually a penalty not entitled to the priority of 11
U.S.C. § 507(a)(7). The court held that the excise tax was a
penalty because it was assessed without reference to the tax
benefits received by the debtor from the pension plan;
therefore, the tax claim was not entitled to a priority. The
court also agreed to subordinate the tax claim to other
unsecured claims to avoid the inequity of the burden on the
unsecured creditors. In re Juvenile Shoe Corp. of
America, 166 B.R. 404 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1994).
T U R N O V E R . The debtors had requested their
employers to withhold excess federal income tax from their
wages for 1990. On their 1990 income tax return, the
debtors requested the IRS to apply the excess taxes to their
1989 tax liability; however, the IRS applied the refund to an
assessment for 1986 even though the debtors were not aware
of any assessment for that taxable year. The IRS then filed a
claim in the bankruptcy court for the 1989 taxes, penalties
and interest. The court held that the IRS was required to
apply the voluntary payment of taxes as requested by the
taxpayers and that the improper “seizure” of the refund was
subject to turnover to the bankruptcy estate. The 1989 taxes
would still remain a valid claim but the 1986 taxes were
dischargeable, for other reasons. In re Ryan, 166 B.R. 757
(Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1993).
CONTRACTS
PURCHASE PRICE. The plaintiff was a watermelon
producer who sold watermelons through the defendant
produce broker during the summer of 1992. At the
beginning of the season the parties orally agreed to a 3 cents
per pound price for the melons. During the summer the price
of melons dropped to 2 1/2 cents per pound but the parties
did not specifically discuss the lower price until the end of
the season when the accounts were settled. The plaintiff
argued that the agreement for 3 cents per pound was to
apply for the whole season and applied to loaded weight.
The defendant showed that the historical practice of the
parties was that the price could and often did fluctuate,
especially late in the season, and that the weight was
determined by the delivery weight. The court held that the
trial court’s judgment for the defendant was supported by
evidence of the course of conduct of the parties to determine
the contract price for the melons. The court treated each
load of melons as a separate contract with the purchase price
fluctuating by the market price of melons. Zolman v. Semo
Produce, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 605 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
AGRICULTURAL LABOR-ALM § 3.02.*  The
plaintiffs were migrant seasonal agricultural workers hired
by one of the defendants, the contractor, to work on another
defendant’s, the farm owner’s, vegetable farm under a
contract between the contractor and the farm owner. The
plaintiffs argued that the farm owner was a joint employer
with the contractor and, as such, was jointly liable for
violations of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker
Protection Act (MSAWPA). The court held that the five
factors of employment contained in 29 C.F.R. §
500.20(h)(4)(ii) and another six factors found in judicial
precedent could be used to determine whether the farm
owner was a joint employer with the contractor. In
reviewing the five regulatory factors, the court held that the
farm owner did not have sufficient control over the workers
because the farm owner only contracted for a specific
number of workers and had no choice over which workers
were hired or fired. The farm owner’s choice of fields to
work did not amount to control over the workers. The court
also held that the farm owner did not exercise sufficient
control over the method of work to be considered a joint
employer because the farm owner provided only de minimis
supervision. The plaintiffs argued that the farm owner had
control over the amount the plaintiffs were paid, but the
court held that the amount paid by the farm owner to the
contractor was reached by arm’s length negotiations
between the farm owner and the contractor who had
independent discretion as to how much of the payments
were then paid to the plaintiffs. The court held that the other
factors did not apply or were conceded by the plaintiffs to
not support a finding that the farm owner was an employer;
therefore, the farm owner was not held to be an employer
subject to MSAWPA. Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, 20
F.3d 434 (11th Cir. 1994).
BORROWER’S RIGHTS-ALM § 11.01[2][g].• The
debtor lost a farm on a foreclosure sale to the FmHA. While
the farm was in the FmHA inventory, the FmHA declared a
wetland’s easement on more than half of the farm. The
FmHA sold the farm to the debtor at a price reduced to
reflect the loss of value from the wetland’s easement. After
the debtor was unable to produce sufficient income from the
farm to meet the purchase payments, the debtor sought
removal of the wetland’s easement as an unlawful cloud on
the title. The court held that the wetlands easement was
allowed under Executive Order 11990 which was not
prohibited by the subsequent Agricultural Credit Act of
1987 or the Food Security Act of 1985 which established
the lease/buyback program. The court also held that an issue
of fact remained as to whether the wetlands were in fact
wetlands when the FmHA acquired the property or were
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changed to become wetlands while in the FmHA possession.
Harris v. U.S., 19 F.3d 1090 (5th Cir. 1994), aff’g, 820 F.
Supp. 1018 (N.D. Miss. 1992).
FARM CREDIT SYSTEM-ALM § 11.01[2].* The case
was removed to federal court based upon the claim that the
Federal Debt Collection Act (FDCA) applied to an issue
raised in the case. The court held that Section 203(b) of the
Farm Credit Act of 1959 stated that subsequent acts of
Congress would not apply to the Farm Credit System banks
unless the acts specifically mentioned the member banks.
Because the FDCA did not specifically mention the
defendant farm credit bank as subject to its provisions, the
FDCA did not apply to the defendant and no federal issue
was involved in the case; therefore, the case was remanded
to the state court. Agribank, FCB v. Bergman, 847 F.
Supp. 118 (S.D. Ill. 1994).
PESTICIDES-ALM § 2.04.* The plaintiff distributed
and sold a product called DLT Mound Leveler to be used to
control fire ant mounds. The EPA had determined that the
product was a pesticide and a state court had determined
that the product was a pesticide. The EPA issued an order
that the plaintiff cease to distribute and sell the product
because the product was not licensed under FIFRA. The
plaintiff filed a federal suit to enjoin the EPA from
preventing the distribution and sale of the product, claiming
that the product was not a pesticide. The court held that
FIFRA did not provide a private right of action to review
actions by the EPA as to pesticides and that the plaintiff was
estopped from denying that the product was a pesticide by
the state court judgment. Turner v. E.P.A., 848 F. Supp.
711 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
TUBERCULOSIS. The APHIS has issued proposed
regulations changing the designation of Virginia from an
accredited-free state to an accredited-free (suspended) state.
59 Fed. Reg. 31921 (June 21, 1994).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[4].* The
decedent’s will bequeathed property to four trusts which had
charitable organizations as partial remainder holders. The
trusts would have qualified as charitable remainder trusts
except that the trusts did not provide a fixed annual
distribution for the current beneficiary. The executor sought
a state court reformation of the trusts to provide a fixed
annual payment to the beneficiaries. The IRS ruled that the
reformation would qualify the trusts for the charitable
deduction for the decedent’s estate. Ltr. Rul. 9422043,
March 4, 1994.
DISCLAIMERS-ALM § 5.02[6].* The surviving spouse
and decedent had established a revocable trust in 1990
funded with community property, with the surviving spouse
and decedent as beneficiaries and trustees. At the decedent’s
death, the surviving spouse removed all of the surviving
spouse’s share of the trust corpus from the trust and
disclaimed any right or power over the decedent’s share of
the trust property, including the right to revoke or amend the
trust, the right to change the beneficiary and the right to
withdraw any property from the trust corpus; however, the
surviving spouse did not disclaim the income interest in the
trust. The surviving spouse had not exercised any power
over the trust corpus other than as successor trustee and the
disclaimer caused the disclaimed trust interests to pass to
other beneficiaries under the terms of the trust. The IRS
ruled that the disclaimer was qualified under I.R.C. § 2518.
Ltr. Rul. 9424023, March 15, 1994.
An irrevocable trust was created by a husband and wife
in 1935, with the son as sole beneficiary and remainders in
the son’s heirs. The son was still alive and had a general
power of appointment over the son’s beneficial interest in
the trust, but if the son failed to exercise the power, the trust
passed to the son’s spouse and children. One of the children
planned to disclaim, either before the son’s death or within
nine months after the son’s death, any beneficial interest in
the trust which would pass to the child at the son’s death if
the son failed to exercise the power. The child’s interest
would then pass under the terms of the trust to the other
heirs. The IRS ruled that the son’s power of appointment
was created prior to 1942 and the lapse of the power would
not be a taxable transfer. The IRS also ruled that the child’s
disclaimer of the beneficial interest, either before the son’s
death or within nine months after the son’s death, would be
a qualified disclaimer. The IRS also ruled that the release or
lapse of either the son’s or the child’s power of appointment
would not subject the trust to GSTT because neither release
or lapse was a taxable transfer. Ltr. Rul. 9424062, March
23, 1994; Ltr. Rul. 9424063, March 23, 1994.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX-ALM
§ 5.04[6].* On the decedent’s death, the decedent held a
lifetime income interest in an irrevocable marital trust
established by the decedent’s predeceased spouse in 1974.
The decedent held a testamentary general power of
appointment over the trust corpus but did not exercise the
power and the trust corpus passed to the predeceased
spouse’s grandchildren. The court held that the trust was
subject to GSTT because the decedent’s failure to exercise
the general power of appointment was a constructive
addition to the trust occurring after the effective date of the
GSTT. The court also held that the application of GSTT to
the trust did not violate the due process clause of the U.S.
Constitution because the tax resulted from the decedent’s
actions after enactment of GSTT and did not violate the
equal protection clause because a rational basis supported
application of the tax to the decedent’s actions. E. Norman
Petersen Marital Trust v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. No. 38
(1994).
An irrevocable trust was established in 1956 which
provided for distribution of income to a charitable
organization until 21 years after the death of certain family
members alive on the date the trust was established. If the
annual income was less than 3 1/2 percent of the value of
the trust assets, the difference was to be paid from principal.
The trust had several years when trust principal was
distributed in order to make a 3 1/2 percent distribution and
the trustees had not recouped the principal in later years
when income exceeded 3 1/2 percent. The beneficiaries
executed codicils to their wills exercising a testamentary
power of appointment which passed any deficiency amount
to the charitable organization. One beneficiary died, making
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the codicil irrevocable, and the other beneficiary executed a
contract to make the codicil irrevocable. The IRS ruled that
the codicils and contract did not subject the trust to GSTT.
Ltr. Rul. 9423018, March 11, 1994.
A decedent’s will in 1955 established a trust for the
decedent’s children and three grandchildren. At the present
time only the three grandchildren survive and the
beneficiaries divided the trust into three identical trusts,
except that some non-pro rata division of assets occurred.
The original trust provided for an investment counselor and
the three trusts would allow the beneficiary, as co-trustee, to
hire an investment counselor to be paid from trust assets.
Neither the trust nor state law allowed for non-pro rata
distributions. The IRS ruled that no gain or loss would be
recognized from the division of the trust except to the extent
of any non-pro rata division of assets. The IRS also ruled
that the division of the trust and the hiring of investment
counselors would not subject the trust to GSTT. Ltr. Rul.
9424026, March 16, 1994.
A decedent’s will in 1973 established trusts for the
decedent’s children and grandchildren. The decedent’s will
did not expressly provide whether income that was not
distributed in a given year was to be available for future
distributions or to be added to corpus. Without advocating
either interpretation, the trustees sought a state court
construction of the will on this issue. The trustees also
sought modification of provisions governing compensation
of the trustees and the procedures for appointment and
removal of trustees. The IRS ruled that the judicial
construction of the will and the trust modifications would
not subject the trust to GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9424048, March
22, 1994.
GIFT-ALM § 6.01.* In 1967, the decedent amended a
1967 will but mistaken omitted a class of beneficiaries
originally included in the 1967 will. After the decedent’s
death, the beneficiaries of several family trusts created by
the will agreed to reinstate the omitted beneficiaries but the
trusts were not finally reformed until after a settlement
reached in a law suit brought by the beneficiaries. The IRS
ruled that the final settlement was consistent with the valid
rights of the parties under the will and state law; therefore,
the settlement did not produce any taxable gifts to the
readmitted beneficiaries. The IRS also ruled that the
settlement did not subject the trusts to GSTT. Ltr. Rul.
9423015, March 9, 1994.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION-ALM § 5.03[2].* The
decedent owned a 26 percent limited partnership interest in
a cattle ranch. The estate elected to value the decedent’s
interest in the partnership land using special use valuation
but decreased the value of the decedent’s interest in the land
by a 30 percent minority discount before applying the
maximum special use valuation reduction. The court held
that the estate could not claim a minority discount if a
special use valuation election is made. Est. of Hoover v.
Comm’r, 102 T.C. No. 36 (1994).
TRUSTS. Fla. Stat. § 737.402(4), effective for
irrevocable trusts in existence before and after enactment of
the statute, provides that any fiduciary power conferred
upon a trustee to make discretionary distributions of either
principal or income to or for the trustee’s own benefit could
not be exercised by the trustee except to provide for that
trustee’s health, education, maintenance or support or except
where the trustee is the grantor or the grantor’s spouse. The
IRS ruled that the statute was ineffective for federal estate
and gift tax purposes to change the rights of any party in
interest in a trust before the date of the statute’s enactment if
federal estate or gift tax consequences have already attached
to the rights.  Rev. Proc. 94-44, I.R.B. 1994-28.
VALUATION-ALM § 6.01[6].* The taxpayers, husband
and wife, transferred their residence to a 30-year trust. The
trust provided that the taxpayers retained the right to use the
residence as their personal residence during the term of the
trust and allowed the taxpayers to either rent or purchase at
fair market value the residence from the remainder
beneficiaries after the termination of the trust. If either
spouse dies, the deceased spouse’s interest passes from the
trust to the surviving spouse. If both taxpayers die before the
termination of the trust, the residence passes to the
remainder beneficiaries, the taxpayers’ children. The IRS
ruled that the trust was a qualified personal residence trust
for purposes of I.R.C. § 2702. Ltr. Rul. 9425029, March
28, 1994.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ACCOUNTING METHOD. The IRS has issued
procedures to be used to obtain expeditious consent to
change methods of accounting for costs subject to I.R.C. §
263A to methods allowed under the regulations.
Compliance with the procedures results in the taxpayer
being deemed to have obtained the consent of the
Commissioner to the changes. The procedures also modify
Rev. Proc. 92-20, 1992-1 C.B. 685 governing changes
during a taxpayer’s first or second taxable year. Rev. Proc.
94-49, I.R.B. 1994-30.
C CORPORATIONS
CONSTRUCTIVE DISTRIBUTIONS. The IRS has
issued proposed regulations governing constructive
distributions on preferred stock redeemable at a premium by
the issuer at the discretion of the issuer. 59 Fed. Reg. 32160
(June 22, 1994).
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS-A L M §
4.02[15].* The taxpayers transferred farmland and cash to a
creditor in partial satisfaction of indebtedness with the
creditor forgiving the remainder of the debt. The value of
the farmland exceeded its basis to the taxpayers and the
taxpayers were insolvent before and after the debt
forgiveness. The court held that although the discharge of
indebtedness income realized from the debt forgiveness
(determined using the land’s fair market value) was not
income to the taxpayers, the gain from the difference
between the land’s fair market value and the taxpayers’
basis in the land was taxable income. Note: the result can be
illustrated graphically as follows:
Not taxable Gain Discharge of indebtedness
|________________|________________|_______________________________|
0 Basis FMV Debt
Gehl v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. No. 37 (1994).
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PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in June 1994,
the weighted average is 7.26 percent with the permissible
range of 6.53 to 7.98 percent for purposes of determining
the full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice
94-71, I.R.B. 1994-26, 14.
The IRS has adopted as final regulations amending the
compensation limit for tax-qualified retirement plans under
I.R.C. § 401(a)(17). 59 Fed. Reg. 32903 (June 27, 1994).
The IRS has adopted as final regulations under I.R.C. §
414(r) implementing the provision that an employer may be
treated as operating separate lines of business for purposes
of applying the minimum coverage requirements of I.R.C. §
410(b). 59 Fed. Reg. 32911 (June 27, 1994).
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS.  The taxpayer was
a shareholder in an S corporation which was insolvent
during the taxable year in which indebtedness was
discharged in a debt restructuring agreement with the
corporation’s creditor. The taxpayer argued that the
discharge of indebtedness income was tax-exempt income
and increased the basis of the taxpayer’s stock before the
corporation reduces its tax attributes by the amount of the
discharge of indebtedness income. The IRS ruled that the
nonrecognition rules of I.R.C. § 108(b) operated only at the
S corporation level and did not result in any pass-through of
income to the shareholders or increase of stock basis.
Instead, the corporation reduces its tax attributes by the
amount of discharge of indebtedness income before
effecting any pass-through of corporation income or
deduction to the shareholders. Ltr. Rul. 9423003, Feb. 28,
1994.
NUMBER OF SHAREHOLDERS. In Rev. Rul. 77-220,
1977-1 C.B. 263, 30 individuals formed a business and
established three corporations of 10 shareholders each in
order to qualify for S corporation status. The business was
operated by a partnership composed of the three
corporations. In Rev. Rul. 77-220, the IRS had ruled that the
corporations would be deemed one corporation not eligible
for the S corporation election because the total number of
shareholders exceeded the maximum allowed (10). The IRS
has revoked Rev. Rul. 77-220 and now recognizes the
corporations as separate for purposes of determining the
number of shareholders. Rev. Rul. 94-43, I.R.B. 1994-27.
TRAVEL EXPENSES. In response to Walker v.
Comm’r, 101 T.C. 537 (1993) (logger allowed travel costs
deductions for travel between residence and temporary work
sites), the IRS has ruled that it will not follow Walker where
the taxpayer’s personal residence is not the principal place
of business and has issued three guidelines for deductibility
of travel costs from a residence to temporary work sites: (1)
daily transportation costs between a residence and
temporary work sites outside of the metropolitan area of the
residence are deductible and such costs for sites in the same
metropolitan area are not deductible; (2) if the taxpayer has
more than one regular place of business, daily transportation
costs to temporary work sites are deductible, wherever
located: and (3) if the residence is the principal place of
business, daily transportation costs to regular or temporary
work sites are deductible. Rev. Rul. 94-47, I.R.B. 1994-29.
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
PRIORITY. The debtors had granted the plaintiff bank
a security interest in all livestock and equipment. The
debtors’ son started a dairy operation and purchased a one-
half interest in dairy cows with money borrowed from a
second bank. The son granted the second bank a security
interest in the cows, a purchase money security interest.
When the son defaulted on that loan, the debtors took 15 of
the son’s cows and obtained a loan from the second bank to
assume the payment for the cows, secured by a security
interest in the cows and all other farm equipment and
products and after-acquired replacement or new property.
Nine years later, the debtors defaulted on their loans and the
banks each asserted a priority security interest in the
debtors’ cows. The second bank argued that its purchase
money security interest continued in the products and
replacements of the original cows but conceded that it could
not completely trace the original 15 cows to specific cows
now owned by the debtors. Therefore, the court held that the
priority of the purchase money security interest was lost as
to the current cows. Citizens Savings Bank v. Miller, 515
N.W.2d 7 (Iowa 1994).
STATE TAXATION
AGRICULTURAL USE. The plaintiff owned 88 acres
of farmland within a city limits. The plaintiff had sold
several parcels of land from the tract in past years for
commercial development and had agreed that the land
would only be sold to commercial developers in the future.
However, the current use of the farmland was for growing
agricultural commodities. The county assessed the land as
commercial development property. The court held that
because the plaintiff agreed that the highest and best use of
the land was for commercial development and that the land
would only be sold for commercial development, the land
was not used solely for agriculture but was held solely for
investment purposes and was to be valued at the commercial
development value. The court stated that if the plaintiff had
demonstrated an intent to indefinitely continue farming the
land, the agricultural use valuation would be proper.
Telkamp v. S.D. State Bd. of Equalization, 515 N.W.2d
689 (S.D. 1994).
TRESPASS
TIMBER.  The plaintiffs had purchased a wooded lot on
which they built a residence. The trees on the lot were not
used for harvesting or other business use. The defendant
purchased a neighboring lot and cleared the lot of trees,
removing some 10-20 trees on the plaintiffs’ lot. The
defendant argued that the value of the removed trees was the
stumpage value because the trees were not grown for
harvest and sale and were indigenous. The court held that
the trees were ornamental and served the practical function
of a dust, wind and visual screen for the plaintiffs’
residence; therefore, the replacement value of the trees was
to be used to calculate damages. The court also held that the
award of treble damages was allowed because the defendant
failed to conduct a survey, failed to locate boundary markers
and failed to notify the plaintiffs of the proposed tree cutting
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in order to locate the true boundary. Sherrell v. Selfors, 871
P.2d 168 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
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WORKERS’
COMPENSATION
EMPLOYER. The plaintiff was an agricultural worker
hired by a farm labor contractor who contracted with
several farm owners, including the defendant, to provide
temporary farm labor. The plaintiff was injured while
working on the fields of the defendant on a temporary basis.
The plaintiff was assigned to the defendant’s fields and
worked under the complete supervision of the defendant’s
foreman. The defendant had the right to reject a specific
worker but could not fire the worker from employment by
the labor contractor. The plaintiff received workers’
compensation throught he contractor  but sued the
defendant for negligence. The defendant claimed that the
plaintiff was a “lent employee” and the defendant was a
“special employer” exempt from a suit for negligence under
the workers’ compensation law. The court held that the
defendant exerted sufficient control over the plaintiff’s
work and the plaintiff had impliedly consented to the
employment by agreeing to such control such that the
defendant was the plaintiff’s joint employer for purposes of
workers’ compensation. Avila v. Northrup King Co., 871
P.2d 748 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including, at no extra
charge, updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $35
each in 1994.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$5.75 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
Satisfaction guaranteed.   30 day return privilege.
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